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Summary
The initiative by the United Nations Mission in South 
Sudan (UNMISS) to establish County Support Bases 
(CSBs) in 35 counties, in addition to the presence it 
already has in 10 state capitals, reflects a new inter-
est in UN peacekeeping operations in pursuing a 
greater nexus between peacekeeping and peace-
building, especially at the local level. In principle, 
the CSBs are a positive development, representing 
a move towards focusing on areas where the need 
is greatest – but they have also given rise to several 
concerns. Internally, UNMISS has had to reassess 
how fast it can move and what it can achieve with 
the CSBs. The CSBs are intended to ‘facilitate the 
extension of state authority’, and serve as a vehicle 
for integration with the UN Country Team (UNCT), 
who are the ones who can actually bring tangible 
development and peace dividends to isolated rural 
areas. Externally, the CSBs are expected to have an 
enabling effect on the extension of state authority 
through co-location of UNMISS staff with govern-
ment counterparts in the counties. Given the delays 
encountered in CSB construction, it is not yet possi-
ble to fully assess their impact, although partial pres-
ence and air movement has already facilitated what 
is often the only link between state authorities and 
rural communities. This policy brief focuses on ex-
ploring the conceptual thinking and vision behind 
the CSBs, the efforts to achieve greater integration 
between UNMISS and UNCT, the challenges UNMISS 
has been facing in developing the CSBs, and how 
the UN plans to use CSBs in the future.
Introduction1
There is an emerging understanding within the Unit-
ed Nations that the ‘peacekeeping–peacebuilding 
nexus’ is an artificial divide: in practice, peacekeepers 
serve as early peacebuilders.  Peacekeeping has devel-
oped from a mostly military model of observing cease-
fires, to featuring a combination of military, police and 
civilian capabilities to support the implementation of 
comprehensive peace agreements and assist in setting 
the foundations for sustainable peace consolidation 
and legitimate governance. However, the peacekeep-
ing–peacebuilding nexus, and what it means to UN 
peacekeeping missions in practice, remains under-ex-
plored, with little research or policy work dedicated to 
thinking about what can be done to ensure that peace-
keeping serves as a catalyst for peacebuilding, espe-
cially below the national level.
The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UN-
MISS) was established on 8 July 2011 by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1996 under a Chapter VII man-
date to assist the Government of the Republic of South 
Sudan (GoRSS) ‘to consolidate peace and security’ and 
to extend and strengthen state authority. In line with 
its mandate, UNMISS is a decentralized mission with 
most of its staff planned to be deployed at state and 
county levels.  
1 This policy brief is partly based on NUPI research conducted in 
October/November 2011, and more recently on interviews with 
UNMISS and other UN personnel conducted by Diana Felix 
da Costa in Juba, South Sudan, in December 2012 and January 
2013. 
2 See United Nations 2012. Peace: Keep it. Build it. The Contribution 
of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding: Strategy. 
UN DPKO & DFS, New York.
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What are the County Support Bases?
To this end, UNMISS plans to establish 35 County 
Support Bases (CSBs). These are an enabling and fa-
cilitating tool intended to support peace consolidation, 
the extension of state authority and the building of na-
tional capacities to enable service delivery to rural pop-
ulations. Accordingly, the aim of the CSB portals is to 
strengthen local government presence and capacity at 
the county level through co-location of UNMISS staff 
with county authorities, and importantly, to facilitate a 
greater presence of UNCT and development partners.
 
The CSB concept is two-pronged: on the one hand, to 
provide accommodation using UNMISS resources; 
on the other hand, to operate as a community ‘portal’, 
built by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). UNMISS staff will be living at the CSB ac-
commodation, but its civilian staff and police are ex-
pected to be co-located with local authorities, depend-
ing on local circumstances and buy-in.3 In addition to 
co-location, CSB personnel are expected to conduct 
frequent field missions, with travel and provision of 
support to surrounding counties.
Guidance on interaction and co-location with local coun-
terparts and authorities is in the process of being final-
ized, but the mission has taken seriously its community 
engagement strategy. For example, in order to avoid the 
usual contrast where UN structures have fuel and ener-
gy whereas the local community has little or none, there 
are plans to develop parallel community projects. The 
Indian Government has pledged to provide solar power 
for local authorities, health centres and schools, while 
UN-Habitat will support CSB locations by introducing 
piped water systems.
A CSB is expected to fa-
cilitate the work of mis-
sion components, and 
although staffing will 
be adapted to local cir-
cumstances, each CSB 
will have approximately 
20–25 personnel. This 
will include various 
substantive personnel 
such as Civil Affairs, 
Human Rights, Correc-
tions, a Recovery, Re-
integration and Peace-
building (RRP) officer, 
as well as up to ten UN 
police officers and three 
or four military liaison 
officers, in addition to 
administrative support 
staff. 
Each CSB will be com-
plemented by a ‘devel-
opment portal’, envisioned as ‘the door to the com-
munity’, to strengthen county authorities through 
improved infrastructure. The portals, funded jointly 
by Norway and the Netherlands, and being built by 
UNDP, are intended to create a centre that will enable 
the government and the community to interact. 
The CSBs are also expected to act as a hub to encour-
age UN agencies, funds and programmes and NGOs 
to operate in remote areas, by providing regular trans-
port links to the county level, as well as and physical 
office and accommodation space. CSB locations will 
automatically have UNMISS flights twice a week, in 
order to facilitate the presence of both government 
and other aid actors. Depending on the security en-
vironment, UNMISS will have its military elements 
located separately, but close to the CSB.
Where are the CSBs?
South Sudan consists of ten states composed of 79 
counties. The old UNMIS had significant presence 
in the three sector headquarters of Juba, Wau and 
Malakal. When South Sudan became independent on 
9 July 2011 and UNMIS was succeeded by UNMISS, 
the mission expanded its presence to a further seven 
states. In addition to UNMISS bases in all ten state 
capitals, it was then planned to have a presence in an-
other 35 counties, increasing the UNMISS presence 
to 45 of a total 79 counties and, when completed, ulti-
mately covering about 56% of the country.
In principle, the selection of the locations of the CSBs 
was discussed with governors, county commission-
ers and communities, and eventually reviewed and 
3 See UN Security Council 





3approved by the Council of Ministers in 2011, on the 
basis of three criteria. These were: 1) conflict-prone 
areas – where conflict had been recently experienced, 
enduring or had a greater impact; 2) areas receiving 
large numbers of returnees, internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) and demobilized SPLA; and 3) areas with a 
potential for economic recovery with multiplier effects. 
By December 2012 four CSBs were considered to be 
operational.4 All four took over previously established 
and fully functioning UNMIS team sites. Nine CSBs 
are planned for completion during the 2013 dry sea-
son that runs roughly from December 2012 to March 
2013; these include high-profile locations like Pibor 
and Akobo counties in Jonglei State. Several of these 
take over former Referendum Support Bases (RSBs) 
locations established as temporary sites by UNMIS to 
support the January 2011 referendum that culminated 
in the independence of South Sudan. 
Learning from the past?
There is much to be learnt from the RSBs. UNMIS orig-
inally planned to have one RSB in every county of South 
Sudan. In fact, they managed to develop 28. Similarly, 
UNMISS had originally planned to develop the 35 CSBs 
over a period of three years, with 19 CSBs expected to be 
operational within the first year in 2012. Early enthusi-
asm has now given way to less ambitious plans, and the 
35 CSBs are now expected to be built up gradually over 
five years, leading up to 2016. Several within the mis-
sion now argue that even the 35 envisioned CSBs are 
too ambitious, and indicate 20 as more realistic figure. 
In practice, the development of the CSBs has been 
delayed by over-ambitious planning, logistical and bu-
reaucratic challenges, and unmet planning assump-
tions. According to one UNMISS official, the mission 
also gave priority to mission air assets originally in-
tended for transporting materials for building CSBs, 
to support the protection of civilians and the provision 
of humanitarian relief. 
The lack of roads and infrastructure means that both 
personnel and construction equipment have to be flown 
in. This is compounded by the long rainy season that 
isolates much of the country for half the year. However, 
these are well-known facts that could have been given 
greater prominence in the planning process. Converse-
ly, UNMISS has had little control over the (un)availabili-
ty of financial resources or the delays in receiving equip-
ment and building material from the now-liquidated 
UNMIS. Further challenges have come from the lack 
of engineering capacity at the mission as well as delays 
in transferring engineering assets from the liquidated 
United Nations Mission to the Central African Republic 
and Chad. The mission has been running at less than 
half its planned engineering capacity. The deployment 
of an additional engineering contingent from South Ko-
rea with greater geographical flexibility is now expected 
to speed up construction of the remaining CSBs.
Looking ahead
In principle, the CSBs are an excellent concept that re-
flect the principle of being present where the need is 
greatest. In practice, they have proven to be a challeng-
ing endeavour. Despite all its years of experience from 
multiple missions, the planning and management cul-
ture of the UN still seems to result in unrealistic and 
over-ambitious plans. DPKO appears especially poor at 
distinguishing between plans that serve political and 
strategic objectives and plans that have to be operation-
ally implemented. The original planning suffered from 
over-optimistic expectations, including not taking full 
account of known factors such as predictable climatic 
conditions. Although UNMISS has now adopted a more 
sober approach, and has reassessed what it can achieve, 
planning still seems too ad hoc and optimistic, in view 
of the logistical challenges encountered thus far.
Given the isolation of many of the counties, local au-
thorities are keen to have CSBs established in their ar-
eas. The CSBs and UNMISS regular flights offer the 
government, the UNCT and other development part-
ners the opportunity for regular visits to these other-
wise largely inaccessible areas. However, if the CSBs 
are to be relevant, and contribute to sustainable capac-
ity at the local level, their everyday relationships with 
the local authorities will be critical. Their success de-
pends on full buy-in both from the GoRSS, politically 
and all the way to the county level, and from the UNCT. 
For such support to be meaningful and sustainable, it 
will need to be provided at a pace that the mission can 
actually deliver on expectations. This may require the 
mission to reduce the footprint envisaged for the CSBs, 
and to ensure that clear guidelines are in place. The 
CSBs will need to coordinate their work closely with the 
GoRSS, and ensure that they complement and support, 
not substitute the work of their local counterparts. 
In supporting the GoRSS, UNMISS should be wary 
of not undermining and weakening other legitimate 
existing local structures of authority. UNMISS’s sup-
port to the extension of state authority will inevitably 
impact on the local political economy and the rela-
tionship between the state, customary authorities and 
the communities. Measures must be put in place for 
monitoring and mitigating against unintended nega-
tive consequences.5 Importantly, this involves under-
standing and engaging more thoroughly with cattle-
camp communities, especially in terms of education 
and alternative livelihoods. 
The CSBs should serve as a vehicle for integration, fa-
cilitating the presence of UNCT and other humanitar-
ian and development actors. Through its 90-plus RRP 
officers and logistical support, through flights and ac-
commodation, the mission seeks to have an ‘enabling’ 
role for UN agencies, funds and programmes. UN-
MISS’s added-value is its staff, ‘thousands of us, which 
UN agencies cannot afford to have’, as one UNMISS 
official noted. Peacekeeping operations have person-
4 Maridi in Western Equatoria State, Raja in Western-Bahr-Ghaz-
al State, and Melut and Nasser in Upper Nile State.
5 C. Aoi, C. de Coning and R. Thakur (eds), 2007. Unintended 
Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations, Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press. 
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nel, material and financial resources. The UNCT have 
the programmatic capacity, access to programmatic 
funds and a longer-term perspective, but limited staff 
and country presence. The UNMISS budget is USD 
839 million per year; the mission has over 1400 cars 
and roughly 10,000 people throughout the country. 
However, as with all UN peacekeeping budgets, most 
of the UNMISS budget is not available for develop-
ment tasks and projects. UNMISS’s human rights 
monitoring and support to capacity development 
must come alongside peace dividends and develop-
ment. UNCT should make use of the CSBs and their 
logistics to reach out where it is most needed, even 
though some in South Sudan argue that UNMISS has 
become too politically compromised for the UNCT to 
work closely with them.6 Moving beyond agency turf-
issues and joining forces must be the way forward. 
At present, most CSBs are still not fully operational, 
and many of the guiding documents have only recently 
been finalized. It is therefore not yet possible to offer a 
full assessment of their impact and trickle-down effects. 
NUPI is keen to continue following the development of 
the CSBs, and to observe how UN personnel in CSBs es-
tablish relationships and interact with society and local 
authorities. Co-location with local authorities is a sound 
way forward, but it remains to be seen to what degree 
UNMISS personnel will be allowed and willing to leave 
their air-conditioned offices and accommodation units, 
to be co-located in the same, often less-equipped, condi-
tions as their government counterparts.  
UNMISS needs to ensure that it avoids creating a cul-
ture of fortified compounds where staff is hostage to 
UN security rules, and end up out of touch with the 
local societies and the local authorities that they have 
been tasked to assist.7 Aware of this danger, the SRSG 
has made it very clear that CSBs should be well inte-
grated in the communities, at walking distance from 
the county commissioner’s office, and should avoid 
large fortified compound walls.8 What is less clear, 
however, is what will happen when these principles 
and co-location do not meet the UN Department of 
Safety and Security’s strict Minimum Operational Se-
curity Standards (MOSS). While the mission’s lead-
ership has been adamant about changing the way 
security is approached in the UN, they may, in real-
ity, have limited influence on how some aspects of a 
large bureaucracy like the UN is run, especially those 
aspects that are informed by system-wide considera-
tions, such as insurance policies. 
The CSBs constitute an attempt by the UN mission to be 
more decentralized and closer to local populations. This 
represents an opportunity to reduce their sense of iso-
lation and marginalization. However, unless the CSBs 
can maintain the perception of the UN’s neutrality, fa-
cilitate development and service delivery and produce 
tangible peace dividends for local populations, they may 
contribute to disillusionment and a loss of confidence 
in the UN and local authorities alike. Managing expecta-
tions will be crucial: this also relates to how the UNCT 
and other development partners plan to make use of the 
CSBs for their own more long-term plans, in terms of 
supporting livelihoods, education and health. 
The CSBs are thus important for following and meas-
uring how well UNMISS manages to implement its 
mandate in South Sudan; how integration and coor-
dination between the mission and the UNCT evolves; 
and more broadly, how the DPKO’s traditionally milita-
ristic structures and rigid bureaucracy are managing to 
adapt to the new peacekeeping–peacebuilding nexus.
6 J. Hemmer, 2013. ‘We are laying the groundwork for our own 
failure’  The UN Mission in South Sudan and its civilian pro-
tection strategy: an early assessment, CRU Policy Brief No. 25, 
Clingendael Institute & NOREF  
7 M. Duffield, 2010. ‘Risk-Management and the Fortified Aid 
Compound: Everyday Life in Post-Interventionary Society’, Journal 
of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 4, no. 4: 453–474. 
8 Interview with SRSG Hilde F. Johnson, January 2013.
